


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On Deadline



Cloak And Dagger Boys Have Blank Check

CPYRGHT

Occasionally the words CIA spring into the headlines with a dateline of some remote part of the world.

What exactly is the Central Intelligence Agency? and how does it operate?

In size and resources the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a David fighting a Russian Goliath. The Soviet Union has the world's largest espionage force, and persons who should know say she spends at least \$2 billion a year in her cloak-and-dagger war against the West.

How much the CIA spends is a secret to everybody except a band of about a dozen men in Washington. You can search the federal budget from cover to cover and never find an item allotting money to the CIA. People qualified to make an educated guess think the annual expenditure is around \$400 million although they concede it will could be twice that much.

Each year the CIA director appears before small panels made up of senior members of the Senate and House appropriations committees. He tells them how much money he needs, but doesn't have to explain what he intends to do with it. After the congressmen okay the round sum, it then is split into many small items which are salted and hidden throughout the federal budget. An item for 500 trucks for the Agriculture Department very well

could be an appropriation for the CIA, which doesn't buy trucks.

Once the CIA has its money, nobody asks how it is being spent although the President conceivably could insist on knowing. Director John A. McCone of the CIA is the only agency head in Washington who can write a check or a voucher for any sum of money he desires without getting permission or explaining it to anybody. Nor does he have to get permission to hire or fire people. One estimate — possibly too high — is that the CIA has 40,000 employees at home and abroad.

But no matter how much money it spends or how many agents it deploys, the CIA still is going to be out-manned and out-spent by the Russians. At the height of the Stalin terror one Russian out of every five was said to be connected in some fashion with espionage although millions were only on a part-time basis and chiefly engaged in spying on one another. Nikita Khrushchev has changed things a bit, but the Soviet Union still musters a formidable army of spies and counterspies.

Allen W. Dulles, former CIA direction, describes it this way: "Today the Soviet state security service (KGB) is the eyes and ears of the Soviet state abroad as well as at home. It is a multi-purpose, clandestine arm of power that can in the last analysis carry out almost any

act that the Soviet leadership assigns to it.

"It is an instrument for subversion, manipulation and violence for secret intervention in the affairs of other nations. It is an aggressive arm of Soviet ambitions in the cold war. If the Soviets send astronauts to the moon, I expect that a KGB officer will accompany them."

Dulles says every Russian organization outside the Soviet Union is loaded with KGB agents—embassies, legations, trade missions, technical advisers and even the United Nations delegation. In some embassies, he adds, the KGB agent may be a chauffeur, but he gives orders to the ambassador.

The CIA cannot do business in such a highhanded and free wheeling fashion because it ultimately is responsible to a democratic government operating in a free society. But it does have one powerful advantage over the KGB. Either through fear or disgust, Russians have been defecting to the West in increasing numbers.

They have included a substantial number of Russians inside the Soviet espionage network, and these are the prize catches of all for the CIA. They began defecting as long ago as 1937 when Walter Krivitsky, chief of Russian espionage in Holland, deserted to the West. This was so damaging to Moscow that Soviet agents were sent to as-

sassinate him. They succeeded in killing him in a Washington hotel, but not before he had turned over invaluable information to the United States.

Others include Alexander Orlov, former Soviet agent in Spain; Igor Gouzenko, who walked out of the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa with all the Russian codes and ciphers in his pocket; Vladimir Petrov, KGB chief in Australia; Yuri Rastvorov, intelligence officer in Tokyo; Peter Deriabin, who deserted his post in Vietnam; and Aleksandr Kasznachayev, who defected from the Soviet diplomatic mission in Burma.

Defection is a two-way street, of course, and the West has suffered some damaging ones, including such scientists as Bruno Pontecovo. But on the balance Dulles believes the West has a clear advantage over the Russians in terms of information supplied by defectors. He indicates there are many Russians who have defected and not yet "surfaced," meaning that the CIA chooses for reasons of its own to keep their stories secret.

The CIA regards KGB agents as efficient, dedicated to their cause and utterly ruthless. Dulles tells a story about Gen. V. S. Abakumov, a Soviet intelligence chief in World War II. His sister was arrested for speculating in the black market and the case was referred to him. He wrote this memo: "Speculation during war time is treason. Shoot her."